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NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEGREGATION IN RECREATION
Since the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education of TopekO. held segregation in public schools to be a
denial of equal protection of the law,2 the question arises whether
the "separate but equal" doctrine 3 should be retained in other
areas.
The purpose of this note is to trace the "separate but equal"
doctrine and to re-examine its validity in education and recreation after the Brown case.4
I.

"Separate But Equal" Before The Fourteenth Amendment

The pattern for the "separate but equal" doctrine was conceived in Roberts v. City of Boston.5 In that case the Boston primary school committee had passed a regulation requiring a child
to get a ticket of admission from a member of the district committee before entering a primary school.6 The plaintiff, a Negro,
applied to enter a particular school other than the two established
for colored children, but the application was denied. Plaintiff
brought suit for damages under a Massachusetts statute prohibiting unlawful exclusion of children from public schools.7
The abolitionists challenged the regulation on the ground that
the constituional phrase "born equal"s necessarily implied that the
1347 U.S. 483

(1953).

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
3 The "separate but equal" doctrine is based upon the theory that
"equal protection" can be provided under a system of segregation, so
long as facilities provided for the minority are "equal" or substantially
equivalent to those reserved for the white race.
4
See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1953).
5 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849).
6Id. at 199.
7Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 214 (1845).
8 Mass. Const. § 2 Art. I. "Equality and Natural Rights of All MenAll men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and
unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying
and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness."
Charles Sumner in arguing for petitioner said, "He may be poor, weak,
humble, or black.. .he may be Caucasian, Jewish, Indian or Ethiopian
race.., he may be French, German, English or Irish extraction; but before the Constitution of Massachusetts all these distinctions disappear. He
is not poor, weak, humble, or black; nor is he French, German, English
or Irish; he is a man, the equal of all his fellowmen." See 2 Works of
Charles Sumner 341 (1875).
2
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law could make no distinctions among equal men.9 The court
held to the contrary. Thus the nucleus of racial segregation prior
10
to the Fourteenth Amendment was established.
Whether or not the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to eliminate all forms of racial segregation has always
been open to conjecture. 1 In the congressional debates on the
Amendment, apart from one equivocal reference, segregation does
not appear to have been specifically discussed.' 2 Perhaps the
reason for the absence of discussion was the general belief that
the purpose of the first section of the Amendment was to incorporate into the Constitution the analogous provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.13 If this were the case, there is ample
authority that the majority of the Amendment's supporters wished
14
Congress to abolish segregation.
Further reasons for the complete abolition of racial segregation were advanced in the congressional debates preceding the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.15 Although the Act was
eventually declared unconstitutional as applied to the particular
case before the court, the decision rested soley upon a restrictive
interpretation of "state action" within the Fourteenth Amendment
which excluded from the scope of congressional power the activi6
ties regulated in the Act.'
1I.

"Separate But Equal" EstablishedIn the Supreme Court

Whatever may or may not have been the intention of its framers, the Fourteenth Amendment proved to be of little consequence
9See brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, p. 6, Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
10 Mass. Gen. Laws c. 256 § 1 (1855).
The Roberts case was overruled
in 1855 by an amendment of the Wilson Act.
11 See Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 Col. L. Rev. 131 (1950).
For a comprehensive
and illuminating analysis of the history behind the Fourteenth Amendment
see Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1954);
Brief of Petitioner, p. 67, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1953); and Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
United States 1083 (1953).
12 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1866).
13 14 Stat. 27 (1866), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1946).
14 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499, 500, 1268 (1866).
lOCong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 763, 843-45, 3258-62 (1872); 2
Cong. Rec. 4116, 4143-45, 4167, 4171-74 (1874).
16Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
It is noteworthy that although the United States Supreme Court construed the language "full and
equal" to require identical facilities for both races, it did not assign that
construction as a reason for avoiding the act.
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in the years immediately following its adoption. 17 In Plessy v.
15
Ferguson.
the Supreme Court presented its views on the meaning

of the Amendment and the legality of the "separate but equal"
doctrine.

In 1890 Louisiana adopted a separate coach law.

Plessy

was an intrastate railroad passenger of mixed descent, apparently
7/8 Caucasian and 1/8 Negro, who refused to obey the instruction
of a train conductor that he move to the space reserved for colored
passengers; instead he insisted upon a seat in the "white" coach.
Arrested and faced with criminal prosecution under the statute,
the petitioner, pleading both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, raised the issue of the constitutionality of stateenforced racial segregation upon a common carrier.

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments on the rationale
that the Amendments did not preclude "separate but equal" facilities.
Justice Harlan in his dissent in the Plessy case pointed out
that many of the decisions of the state courts which the majority
relied on were rendered before the Amendments were passed."9
Although the majority's logic in the Plessy case may have been
faulty, nevertheless, the "separate but equal" doctrine furnished
a base from which those who sought to nullify the Reconstruction
Amendments were permitted to operate in relative security.
The nucleus of the majority opinion was summarized in two
sentences: "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found
17 People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883); Bertonneau v.
Bd. of Directors of City Schools, 3 Fed. Cas. 294, No. 1361 (C.C.D. La.
1878); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 357 (1874); State ex rel. Games v.
McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 207, 208 (1872). For citations to many of these
early cases, see Morrison v. State, 116 Tenn. 534, 95 S.W. 495 (1906),
which upheld a Tennessee statute requiring separation of white and Negro
passengers on street cars. Where the Fourteenth Amendment was considered, primary attention was given to the privileges and immunities
clause. Cf. Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 364, 46 N.W. 718 (1890).
The court, while invalidating a statute requiring racial segregation in
public eating establishments in Michigan, dismissed the Roberts decision,
5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849), as an irrelevant precedent from "ante-bellum
days."
Board of Education v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 (1881).
Later when
separate but legal education had been expressly provided for by the legislature, the same Kansas court in Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66
Kan. 672, 684-688, 691, 72 Pac. 272 (1903), upheld the act.
18163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19 Id. at 563.
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in the Act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
''
construction upon it. 20
As Mr. Justice Harlan realized at the time of the decision,
and as hindsight indicates, it is clear that segregation has been
enforced as a means of subordinating the Negro, rather than insuring him substantially equal rights. 21
Although the Plessy case was limited to transportation, it
served as a springboard to apply to human activities at every level.
It has followed the Negro into prisons, 22 wash houses in coal
mines, 23 telephone booths, 24 and the armed forces. 2 The doctrine
27
26
has been applied to every type of transportation, education
and amusement, 28 to public housing, 29 restaurants,30 hotels, 31 libraries, 32 public parks and recretional facilities, 33 fraternal associations, 34 marriage, 35 employment, 36 and public welfare institutions.37
2OId. at 557, 559.

Note, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 69, 72 (1950).
Mangum,
M
The Legal Status of the Negro 230-235 (1940).
23Ark. Stat. Ann. § 52-625 (1947); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 45, § 231
(1937); Tenn. Code Ann. § 5673 (Williams 1934).
24 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 135 (1937).
25See Dollard and Young, In the Armed Forces, 36 Survey Graphic 66
(1947); To Secure These Rights, Report of the President's Committee on
Civil Rights 40-47 (1947).
26 McCabe v. Atchison T. and S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); C. and 0.
Ry. v. Comm'n of Ky., 179 U.S. 388 (1900); Louisville, N.O. and T. Ry. v.
Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890); Cf. Henderson v. United States, 339
U.S. 963 (1949), rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 846 (1950); Mitchell v.
United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
27 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Berea College v. Kentucky,
211 U.S. 45 (1908); Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
2S Law v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346 (D.
Md. 1948); Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 465, 218 S.W.2d 30
(1949).
29 Favors v. Randall. 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1942); Seawell v. MacWhithey, 2 N.J. 563, 67 A.2d 309 (1949); Denard v. Housing Authority,
203 Ark. 1050, 159 S.W.2d 764 (1942).
30Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949);
Galloway v. Strauss, 67 Fla. 426, 65 So. 588 (1914).
31 State v. Steele, 106 N.C. 766, 11 S.E. 478 (1890).
321Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10474 (1939); Tex Stat., Rev. Civ. Art. 1688
(1945); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 125-10 (1943)
33 Infra notes 48, 49, 50, 51.
34Va. Code § 38-281 (1950); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-267 (1943).
35Note, 28 Neb. L. Rev. 475 (1949).
36 S.C. Code § 1272 (1942); see Mangum, The Legal Status of the Negro
171-180 (1940).
37See compilation in Mangum, The Legal Status of the Negro 223-230
(1940).
21

2
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III. Recent Decline Of Segregation
In recent cases involving other activities there is a clear trend
against segregation.
A.

HOUSING

When faced with segregation of housing facilities, the Supreme Court invalidated as an arbitrary interference with property rights a municipal ordinance which established separate residential areas for Whites and Negroes.38
Similarly in Shelley v. Krame2 9 the court refused to uphold
state court enforcement of racial restrictive agreements which
were made by private individuals and which ran with the land.
B.

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

The "separate but equal" doctrine was first accepted4 0 and
later rejected in interstate transportation. 41 However, the Court
rested its decisions on the premise that state segregation statutes
42
were burdens on interstate commerce.
From the language in the cases, it is doubtful that the Court
would uphold segregation in interstate transportation if forced to
decide the equal protection issue.
C.

EDUCATION

When approached with the problem of equality in education
at the graduate level, the court intimated in Sweatt v. Painter43
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents 4 that substantially
equal facilities were not feasible when education of a technical
nature was involved. 45
Not until the Brown decision46 did the Court fully reject Plessy
v. Ferguson47 as applied to education.

3SBuchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.

60 (1917).
39334 U.S. 1 (1948).
4OChiles v. C & 0 Ry., 218 U.S. 71 (1910); C & 0 Ry v. Comm'n of
Ky 179 U.S. 388 (1900).
41 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia,
328 U.S. 373 (1946); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
42 Ibid.
43 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
44 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
45 See Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948)
and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
46 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
47 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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D.

SEGREGATION IN RECREATION

Segregation in public swimming pools, 48 golf courses, 9 playgrounds, 50 and tennis courts 51 has been upheld by state and lower
federal courts. In considering desegregation of recreational facilities the following question should be asked: can recreational
facilities ever be substantially equal?
A sizable proportion of the lower court decisions on segregation in recreation have held facilities for Negroes not substantially
52
equal to those for Whites.
In Williams v. Kansas City53 the court held that the swimming

facilities in Kansas City were not substantially equal; although
Negroes were allowed to use other facilities of the city's largest
park, they could not use its pools, but had to swim at a segregated
pool in another part of the city.
However, in Rice v. Arnold54 the Florida Court held golf faci-

lities to be substantially equal although Negroes were allowed to
play on the courses only once a week. Upon remand by the United
56
55
State Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Sweatt
and McLaurin cases,5 7 the Florida Court 58 again upheld segrega48Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949); Williams v. Kansas'
City, Mo., 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952); Draper v. City of Saint
Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950); Lawrence v Hancock, 76 F.
Supp. 1004 (SD. W. Va. 1948); Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App.
373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948); Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal.
1944); Kern v. City of Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940).
49 Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (D. Md. 1950); Hayes v.
Crutcher. 108 F. Supp. (M.D. Tenn. 1952); Sweeney v. City of Louisville,
102 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Deal v. Holcombe, 103 F. Supp. 218
(S.D. Tex. 1950); Law v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F.
Supp. 346 (D. Md. 1948); Rice v. Arnold, 45 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1950).
50 Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950); Camp v. District of
Columbia, 104 F. Supp. 10 (D. D.C. 1952).
51Winkler v. State, 194 Md. 1, 69 A.2d 674 (1949).
52Williams v. Kansas City, Mo., 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952);
Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Beal
v. Holcombe. 103 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Tex. 1950); Lawrence v. Hancock,
76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Law v. Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346
(D. Md. 1948); Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944);
Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948); Kern
v. Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940).
53 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
5445 So.2d. 195 (Fla. 1950).
55 340 U.S. 848 (1950).
5G339 U.S. 629 (1950).
57 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
5S 54 So.2d. 115 (Fla. 1951).
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tion on the rationale that those cases had not expressly reversed
Plessy v. Ferguson.59 Thus the court on rehearing held that
Negroes denied access to the golf courses six days out of seven
had rights substantially equal to those of Whites.
Assuming that the Negro is allowed his one day per week
on the golf course or in the swimming pool, it is a perversion of
language to say he has substantially equal rights when denied admittance six days out of seven.
Although substantially equal facilities are feasible, nevertheless, as a practical matter, such a situation almost never exists.
-

IV.

The Brown Case: What Effect On Segregation In Recreation?

In the Brown case it was stated, "We conclude that in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.""
Will this doctrine of inherent inequality be applied to the field of
public recreation, thus completely banning segregation in recreational facilities? This question has never arisen in the United
States Supreme Court.
Since the Supreme Court tends to restrict its decisions in each
case to the narrowest possible field,6' the lower courts may continue to apply the "separate but equal" doctrine until the Supreme
Court definitely rules upon the question whether the "separate
but equal" doctrine retains any vitality and whether it may specifically be applied to the field of recreation. The Brown case, however, may contain hints as to the Court's present attitude concerning the legality of publicly maintained segregation.
The Supreme Court cited as inconclusive, arguments surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 2 Though admitting that such sources cast some light on the problem, the Court
added that it must consider public education in the light of its
full development and its present place in American life throughout
the nation. 63 Certainly recreation in public owned or operated
facilities has also reached a highly important place in American
life. Furthermore, the Court in the Brown case stressed that "to
separate them [children in grade and high schools] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gener59163 U.S. 537 (1896).
60 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1953).
61 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S.
(1947).
62 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
63 Id. at 492.
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ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone."6
With a general ban on segregation in public education it would
be a necessary corollary that a public school could not invoke
segregation on its playgrounds and other physical education facilities." Can it be said that segregation in other forms of public
recreation has a greatly different effect on the Negro?
In the Brown opinion, it was stated that the impact of segregation is greater when it has the sanction of law. 66 The Court
cited seven modern authorities on psychology6 7 to the effect that
enforced segregation has generally harmful effects. Only one of
those authorities, at the pages cited by the Court, directed his
68
It
attention primarily to the effect of segregation in education.
is unlikely that the Court will place less weight on such sources
when deciding future segregation cases.
In cases involving the District of Columbia, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply. Therefore, the Court in Boling v. Sharpe,69 a companion case to the
Brown decision, held segregation in the public schools of the Dfstrict of Columbia to be violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
V.

Decisions Since The Brown Case

Seven days after the Brown case, six segregation cases were
disposed of by the Supreme Court, one of which concerned recreation.70 In every instance where the lower courts held segregation

64

Id. at 494.

65 BMcLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
66347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
67

Ibid.

68 Brameld, Educational

Costs in Discrimination and National Welfare
44-48 (1949).
69 347 U.S. 497 (1953).
See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)
where the Supreme Court held that the restrictive covenant violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
70 Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 347 U.S. 971
(1953); Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U.S. 974 (1953) (segregation in use of
golf facilities); Housing Authority of San Francisco v. Banks, 347 U.S.
974 (1953); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971
(1953); Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University,
347 U.S. 971 (1953); Wichita Falls Junior College v. Battle, 347 U.S.
974 (1953).
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invalid, the Supreme Court denied certiorari ;71 but in each instance where the lower court had held segregation valid, the Court
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case
to the lower court.7'
Since the Brown case, two federal courts have decided segregation cases on the basis of the "separate but equal" doctrine.
Lonesome v. Maxwell, the first of the two cases, held segregated
swimming facilities "inherently as well as physically equal."7 3
In the second case, Holmes v. City of Atlanta,74 several
Negroes sought a declaratory judgment enjoining the city of Atlanta from denying them the use of the city's golf courses. Atlanta provided no golfing facilities for Negroes; money had been
earmarked for a Negro course, but it was estimated that completion of a nine-hole course would require at least a year.
The federal court granted the injunction on the ground that
plaintiffs were not offered facilities substantially equal to those
offered Whites. It reaffirmed the "separate but equal" doctrine,
stating that the ruling in the Brown case applied only to public
education.
The Holmes case, in asserting that the "separate but equal"
doctrine was rejected only in application to public education, added, "This is further evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court
at the time of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education...
had before it the case of Beal v. Holcombe... on application for
certiorari wherein the Court reasserted the 'separate but equal'
doctrine as it applied to municipally owned and operated golf
courses, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 75
Thus the court in the Holmes case seemed to infer approval
of the "separate but equal" doctrine from the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in the Beal case.7 6 However, in that case, the
Negro plaintiffs had won in the court of appeals"7 and it was the
defendant city which sought certiorari. Thus the Supreme Court
71 Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U.S. 974 (1953); Housing Authority of San
Francisco v. Banks, 347 U.S. 974 (1953); Wichita Falls v. Battle, 347
U.S. 974 (1953).
72 Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 347 U.S. 971
(1953); Muir v. Louisville Park, 347 U.S. 971 (1953); Tureaud v. Board
of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 347 U.S. 971 (1953).
73 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954).
74124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D.Ga. 1954).
75 Id. at 293.
76Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
77Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d. 384 (5th Cir. 1954).
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would have had to go out of its way to decide the case on the
ground of the "separate but equal" doctrine to recreation. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, "A variety of considerations underlie denials of the
writ [of certiorari], and as to the same petition different reasons
may lead different justices to the same result."' b
VI.

Policy Considerations

It has been argued that legislation planned to prevent friction
between Negroes and Whites is more necessary to preserve the
79
peace than is legislation enforcing segregation in the schools.
Fear of racial violence, presupposing inadequacy of local police
forces, has been raised in many segregation cases. Such fear
does not, however, present a legal warrant for deprivation of
constitutional rights. This was well stated by Mr. Justice Day
in Buchanan v. Warley:
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public
peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances (or customs) which
deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.0

As the Court stated in the Brown case, the actual manner in
which desegregation is to be administered will be decided on fur-

ther argument.

It is unlikely that the Court will grant certiorari

in the recreation cases before desegregation in education is completely effected. Further segregation cases might well be delayed
for an extended period, that is, until such time as the Court feels

that the nation is ready for a further step.
7, 338 U.S. 912 (1950); cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542, 543 (1952).
79 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 60 (1944)
gives the ranks of discriminations:
"1.
Highest in this order stands the bar against intermarriage and sexual intercourse involving white women. 2. Next comes
the several etiquettes and discriminations, which specifically concern behavior in personal relations.
(These are the barriers against peculiar
rules as to handshaking, hat lifting, use of titles, house entrance to be
used, social forms when meeting on streets and in work, and so forth.
These patterns are sometimes referred to as the denial of social equality
in the narrow meaning of the term.)
3. There after follow the segregations and discriminations in use of public facilities such as schools, churches
and means of conveyance.
4. Next comes political disfranchisement.
5.
Thereafter comes discriminations in law courts, by the police, and by other
public servants.
6. Finally come the discriminations in securing land,
credit, jobs. or other means of earning a living, and discriminations in
public relief and other social welfare activities."'
<0 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).
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Conclusion
The "separate but equal" doctrine has provided the basis for
segregation in the United Stated for a long period of time. But
the Supreme Court has carved away at it until today there is no
legal sanction for segregation in housing, in interstate transportation, and in most, it not all, levels of publicly provided education.
In light of this clearly established trend of decisions, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would in the future uphold segregation in recreation.
An analysis of the Brown and Bolling cases, both of which
stressed sociological and psychological factors, along with the Supreme Court's manner in disposing of a number of segregation
cases following them, points even more strongly to the conclusion
that the "separate but equal" doctrine will be quashed in recreation.
Ira S. Epstein, '56
Gerry L. Fellman, '56

